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INTRODUCTION

Over 100,000 people in the United States die each year due to
“nonerror, adverse effects” of prescription drugs. 1 Most of the
prescriptions being filled in the United States are generic. In 2012,
eighty-four percent of dispensed prescriptions were generic and the
amount of money spent on generic prescriptions increased by $8
billion.2 Because of recent changes in failure-to-warn claims against
drug manufacturers, generic drug users who are injured by taking the
drug are facing an unfortunate dilemma.
In 1984, federal law changed the way the pharmaceutical
markets operate by making prescription drugs more affordable for
consumers.3 But affordability comes at another cost. Because of the
federal law preemption doctrine and gaps between state and federal
labeling requirements, generic drug consumers who are injured by
taking the drug are unable to sue the manufacturer for inadequate
labeling, even though consumers injured by brand name drugs can
sue the brand name manufacturer for the same inadequate labeling.4
The 1984 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act (Hatch–Waxman Act) allowed for generic drugs to
obtain Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval by showing
that the generic drug is biologically equivalent to the brand name
drug and that the labeling of the generic drug is the same as the

* Samantha Koopman is a second year student at Pepperdine University
School of Law. Samantha graduated from Gonzaga University with a Bachelor of
Business Administration in Accounting and Finance. I would like to thank editors
Alice Won, Steve Dixon, and especially Emily Casey for all of their hard work and
help to make this comment the best it could be. I also owe a huge thank you to
God for an extremely blessed life full of great opportunities, my family for their
unwavering belief in me as a student and a writer, my dog Stanley for his constant
presence at my side while I wrote, and my fiancé Ryan for loving me, encouraging
me, and bringing home Big Gulps and Reese’s on especially rough days. I love
you guys!
1

Barbara Starfield, Is US Health Really the Best in the World?, 284 J. AM.
MED.
ASS’N
483,
484
(2000),
available
at
http://www.drugeducation.info/documents/iatrogenic.pdf.
2
Id.
3
21 U.S.C. § 2(j) (2012).
4
PUBLIC CITIZEN, GENERIC DRUG LABELING 24 (2013), available at
http://www.citizen.org/documents/2138.pdf.

114

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

34-1

approved labeling for the brand name drug.5 Many state laws have
different requirements for generic and brand name drugs, so
preemption issues arise. In Wyeth v. Levine, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that federal drug regulations do not preempt state law failure-towarn claims against the brand name manufacturers, 6 but the Court in
PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing later held that federal drug regulations do
preempt the same state law failure-to-warn claims against the
In the recent Mutual
manufacturers of generic drugs. 7
Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett case, the Court held that
manufacturers of generic drugs cannot be sued under state law for
design-defect claims because the state law is preempted by federal
law.8
The impact of these cases is great on consumers who choose
to take a generic drug over a name brand. Most people who buy
prescription medication buy the generic brand when available. 9
Often a brand name manufacturer will stop selling its drug once the
generic brand enters the market. 10 And all states allow the
substitution of the generic drug for the brand name, with some states
These decisions impact
even requiring the substitution. 11
administrative law by making it clear that Congress and the FDA
need to change the regulations governing manufacturers of generic
brands so that consumers have a remedy under state tort law when
they choose to save money by purchasing generic brand prescriptions
instead of their brand name counterparts. If generic manufacturers
are able to unilaterally change their drug labels, they could keep up
with new warnings without having to rely on brand name

5

See supra, note 3.
Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009).
7
PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011).
8
Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013).
9
See Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2584 (citing DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVS., ASPE ISSUE BRIEF: E XPANDING THE USE OF GENERIC DRUGS 7 (2010),
available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/sp/reports/2010/GenericDrugs/ib.pdf).
10
Id. (citing Brief for Marc T. Law et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 18, PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011) (No. 09-993)).
11
Id. at 2583 (citing Thomas P. Christensen et al., Drug Product Selection:
Legal Issues, 41 J. AM. PHARM. ASS’N 868, 869 (2001); DEPT. OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVS., supra note 9, at 7). States that require substitution when possible
are Florida, Hawaii, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont,
and West Virginia. See infra note 53.
6
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manufacturers. Such a change would likely prompt the Court to
change its position as well.12
This comment will explain how claims against drug
manufacturers may or may not be preempted depending on whether
the drug that caused the injury was a brand name or generic drug, and
will suggest several ways that the seemingly incongruous results of
these claims can be balanced for injured patients. Part II explains the
historical progression of federal drug labeling laws and the
differences between state generic substitution laws. Part III describes
the federal preemption doctrine and failure-to-warn claims under
state law. Part IV examines recent case law from the Supreme Court
concerning the applicability of federal drug regulations to brand
name and generic drug manufacturers. Part V assesses the innovator
liability theory proposed by some courts and the implications of the
theory for drug manufacturers. Part VI considers the impact the
recent Court decisions may have on generic drug substitution. Part
IV proposes various ways that the options for patients injured by
prescription drugs can be improved.
II.

FEDERAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK OF THE
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY

A. Early Drug Regulation—The Food and Drug Administration and
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
The FDA was created to enhance public health and protect
consumers by regulating food and drugs in the United States.13 The
FDA’s regulatory duties began with the Pure Food and Drugs Act,
which was passed by Congress in 1906.14 It provided basic elements
of food and drug protection, 15 but did not require any federal
12

See infra Part VII.A–B.
History,
U.S.
FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/default.htm (last updated May
29, 2013).
14
Legislation,
U.S.
FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Legislation/default.htm (last updated
July 9, 2012).
15
FDA
History–Part
I,
U.S.
FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Origin/ucm054819.htm (last
updated June 18, 2009). The 1906 Food and Drug Act banned interstate transport
of illegal food and drugs and regulated drug labeling by requiring drugs to be
13
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approval or notification procedures for new drugs prior to their
In 1938, the
placement in the pharmaceutical market. 16
pharmaceutical market was revolutionized by the passage of the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA). 17 Enacted in
response to the death of 107 people after those people took a legally
marketed drug,18 the FDCA’s purpose was to create a notification
system where brand name drug manufacturers were required to
provide safety data to the FDA in a new drug application (NDA). 19
The FDCA gave authority to the FDA to prevent a new drug from
entering the market if the drug’s safety was not properly
demonstrated. 20 The NDA required extensive information from
brand name drug manufacturers, including:
(A) full reports of investigations which have been
made to show whether or not such drug is safe for use
and whether such drug is effective in use; (B) a full
list of the articles used as components of such drug;
(C) a full statement of the composition of such drug;
(D) a full description of the methods used in, and the
facilities and controls used for, the manufacture,
processing, and packing of such drug; (E) such
samples of such drug and of the articles used as
components thereof as the Secretary may require; (F)
specimens of the labeling proposed to be used for
labeled in accordance with specific standards. Id. Food and drug labels were not
allowed to be misleading or untrue and certain “dangerous” ingredients had to be
listed on the label. Id.
16
Colleen Kelly, The Balance Between Innovation and Competition: The
Hatch–Waxman Act, the 2003 Amendments, and Beyond, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
417, 419 (2011).
17
See Legislation, supra note 14.
18
Id.; see Carol Ballentine, Sulfanilamide Disaster, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/whatwedo/history/productregulation/sulfanilamidedis
aster/default.htm (last updated Oct. 7, 2010) (describing the 1937 Elixir
Sulfanilamide Incident, in which more than 100 people in fifteen states died from
ingesting a sulfanilamide elixir mixed with diethylene glycol, which turned out to
be a deadly poison but was not realized before the medication was distributed to
patients because food and drug laws at the time did not require safety studies to be
done on new drugs).
19
Kelly, supra note 16, at 419.
20
Id.
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such drug; and (G) any assessments required under
section 335c of this title. 21
Applicants must also describe all of their experiences and
observations during all phases of development and ownership,
including descriptions and analyses of any information material to
the safety and effectiveness of the drug.22
In 1962, the FDA’s regulatory authority was reinforced by the
passage of the Keflauver–Harris Amendments,23 which changed the
drug safety review procedure from a simple notification process to a
more complex approval system. 24 The amendments shifted the
burden of proof from the FDA to the drug manufacturers by forcing
manufacturers to show that their drugs were safe for use before the
drug could be marketed.25 Under the new law, the NDA was “the
vehicle through which drug sponsors formally propose that the FDA
approve a new pharmaceutical for sale and marketing in the U.S.”26
Application approval required the manufacturer to submit reports
showing: (1) that the drug is safe and effective for use; (2) the
components and composition of the drug; (3) the methods, facilities,
and controls used to manufacture, process, and pack the drug; (4)
samples of the drug and its components; (5) examples of the drug’s
proposed label; and (6) research on pediatric use, if applicable. 27
Once the manufacturer submitted its application, the FDA would
either approve the drug or give the manufacturer an opportunity for a
hearing on whether the application may be approved. 28
After the passage of the 1962 Drug Amendments, the FDA
implemented numerous procedures governing the approval of generic
drugs. Under the updated procedures, a generic drug manufacturer of
a pre-1962 brand name drug submitted an abbreviated new drug
application (ANDA), which required data demonstrating that the
21

21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2012).
21 C.F.R. § 314.50(d)(5)(iv) (2014).
23
See Legislation, supra note 14.
24
Kelly, supra note 16, at 420.
25
21 U.S.C. § 355(d).
26
New Drug
Application,
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/
HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/ApprovalApplications/NewDrugApplication
NDA/ (last updated Feb. 21, 2013).
27
21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1).
28
Id. § 355(c)(1).
22
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generic drug was as safe and effective as its brand name
counterpart.29 Generic manufacturers of post-1962 brand name drugs
had to submit the entire NDA, although the FDA did allow for
generic manufacturers to use published scientific literature to
demonstrate safety and effectiveness rather than require them to
perform their own clinical trials, as was required of the brand name
drug manufacturers.30
In 1983, the FDA proposed a new regulation that would allow
for generic drug manufacturers of post-1962 brand name drugs to
only have to complete the ANDA process. At the same time, the
generic drug manufacturers filed a lawsuit against the FDA, hoping
to force the FDA to create an ANDA process for all generic drug
manufacturers. 31 Eventually, Congress resolved the controversy
surrounding generic drug approval by passing the Hatch–Waxman
Act.32
B. The Hatch–Waxman Act
Amid complaints and controversy surrounding the differing
procedures for generic drug manufacturers trying to get drugs
approved for marketing, 33 Congress passed the Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 34 that
“effectively created the modern generic pharmaceutical industry.”35
The Act, commonly known as the Hatch–Waxman Act, was designed
to balance two competing interests: to encourage brand name
pharmaceutical companies to continue investing in the research and
development of new drugs while also increasing competition among

29

Kelly, supra note 16, at 420.
Id.
31
Id.; see Nat’l Ass’n of Pharm. Mfrs., Inc. v. Heckler, 83 Civ. 4817 (WCC)
(S.D.N.Y. 1983). This case was dismissed once the Hatch–Waxman Act was
enacted because the Act superseded all prior FDA regulations regarding the generic
drug approval process. Kelly, supra note 16, at 420.
32
Kelly, supra note 16, at 420.
33
Id.
34
21 U.S.C. § 301 (2012).
35
Matthew Avery, Continuing Abuse of the Hatch–Waxman Act by
Pharmaceutical Patent and the Failure of the 2003 Amendments, 60 HASTINGS L.J.
171, 175 (2008).
30
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generic drug manufacturers in the pharmaceutical market as a way to
lower drug prices and costs to consumers. 36
A Report by the House Committee on Energy and Commerce
analyzed the ANDA procedure and patent term restoration pieces of
the Act.37 Congress’s goal was to lower the cost of drug prices for
consumers by making it easier for generic drugs to enter the
pharmaceutical market. 38 The House Report remarked that full
NDAs, which required human clinical studies, were not valuable or
efficient for the generic manufacturer. Instead, the FDA recognized
that requiring the manufacturers to repeat the testing would be
“unnecessary and wasteful [as well as] unethical because it requires
that some sick patients take placebos and be denied treatment known
to be effective”39 The Report also acknowledged that most drugs at
the time had expired patents but no generic equivalent, demonstrating
a need for a process to increase the presence of generic drugs in the
market. 40 Additionally, the Report determined that increased
availability of generic drugs would “save American consumers $920
million over the next 12 years,” and would save federal and state
governments millions of dollar as well. 41
Congress’s other goal of incentivizing research companies to
develop new drugs was an effort to “restor[e] some of the time lost
on patent life while the product is awaiting pre-market approval.”42
Although the patent term was seventeen years, the effective patent
term was shorter because of the requirements of the regulatory
review process. 43 Congress adopted the ANDA procedures and
patent term restoration in the Act to help solve some of these
problems.
36

Kelly, supra note 16, at 417. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1 (1984), for
Congress’s reasoning in passing the Act. “Congress aimed to increase generic drug
entry into the pharmaceutical market in order to drive down drug prices and
consumer drug costs. . . . [I]t was not beneficial or efficient for generic drug
manufacturers to submit full NDAs,” and there was a “need for a streamlined
process to increase the number of generic drugs on the market.” Kelly, supra note
16, at 421.
37
H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 1 (1984).
38
Id.
39
Id. at 16.
40
Id. at 17.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 15.
43
Id. at 17.
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The Hatch–Waxman Act amended a portion of the FDCA by
allowing all generic drug manufacturers to use an ANDA to prove
the safety and effectiveness of their drugs. 44 The ANDA requires
generic drug manufacturers to show that their new generic drug
is bioequivalent to the [brand name] drug[,] . . . that
the active ingredients of the new drug are of the
pharmacological or therapeutic class as those of the
[brand name] drug, . . . and the new drug can be
expected to have the same therapeutic effect as the
[brand name] drug when administered to patients for
[the same] condition . . . .45
Because of the changes Congress put into place, the cost of bringing
a generic drug to the market is less than $2 million, almost a quarter
of the typical cost of bringing a brand name drug to market.46
Additionally, brand name drug manufacturers must conduct
human tests to show that the drug is safe and effective, and must
submit those results in an NDA. 47 However, generic drug
manufacturers are no longer required to provide their own clinical
trial data to show safety and efficacy, and are able to use the brand
name drug’s clinical trial data instead.48 This new regulatory system
under Hatch–Waxman is designed to guarantee the quality of generic
drugs, simplify the approval process, reduce unnecessary time and
money sunk into repetitive clinical trial research, and lessen the time
to get the drugs on the market.49
C. Drug Substitution Laws
In an effort to help consumers save money on prescription
drug costs, states have put substitution policies into place that allow
44

Avery, supra note 35, at 175.
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv) (2012).
46
DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ASPE ISSUE BRIEF: EXPANDING THE
USE
OF
GENERIC
DRUGS
4–5
(2010),
available
at
http://aspe.hhs.gov/sp/reports/2010/GenericDrugs/ib.pdf.
47
Danielle L. Steele, The “Duty of Sameness” as a Shield—Generic Drug
Manufacturers’ Tort Liability and the Failure of the Need for Label Independence
After PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 441, 448 (2013).
48
Avery, supra note 35, at 176.
49
Id.
45
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pharmacists to dispense cheaper generic equivalents for brand name
drugs; that is, when a physician fills out a prescription, he or she has
the option of requiring the brand name be dispensed. 50 If the
physician does not specify that the brand name drug is required, state
laws step in to explain when substitution is allowed. Eleven states
require express permission for substitution. 51 The other thirty-nine
states allow generic substitution unless the physician expressly
forbids it. 52 When substitution is allowed, some states require
50

See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 4052.5(b) (West 2013) (“In no case
shall a [generic substitution] be made . . . if the prescriber personally indicates,
either orally or in his or her own handwriting, ‘Do not substitute’ or words of
similar meaning.”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 217.822(1) (West 2013) (“When a
pharmacist receives a prescription for a brand name drug . . . he shall select a lower
priced therapeutically equivalent drug . . . .”); see also PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing,
131 S. Ct. 2567, 2583 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“[A]ll States ‘allow the
physician to specify that the brand name must be prescribed, although with
different levels of effort from the physician.’”).
51
Oklahoma forbids substitution of the generic equivalent without the
physician’s authority. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 353.13(D) (West 2013).
Alabama, Delaware, Indiana, Missouri, South Carolina, Utah, and Washington all
require physicians to sign on one of two lines to indicate that he or she permits or
forbids substitution of the generic equivalent. See ALA. CODE § 34-23-8(4) (2014);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 2549(a)(1), (c) (2014); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-42-22-6,
16-42-22-8(a)(1) (West 2013); MO. REV. STAT. § 338.056 (2013); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 39-24-40(b) (2013); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-17b-605(6)(a) (West 2013);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.41.120 (West 2013). Maine requires physicians to
check a box to indicate that substitution of the generic equivalent is forbidden. See
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 13781 (2013). New York requires physicians to
write “d a w” (meaning “dispense as written”) to prohibit substitution of the
generic equivalent. See N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6810(6)(a) (McKinney 2014).
Pennsylvania requires physicians to write “brand necessary” or “brand medically
necessary” on the prescription to indicate that substitution of the generic equivalent
is forbidden. See 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 960.3(a) (West 2014).
52
The states that allow generic substitution unless expressly forbidden by the
physician are Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont,
Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 32-1963.01(A) (2014) (“If a medical practitioner prescribes a brand name
drug and does not indicate an intent to prevent substitution . . . a pharmacist may
fill the prescription with a generic equivalent drug.”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
112, § 12D (West 2014) (“Except in cases where the practitioner has indicated ‘no
substitution’, the pharmacist shall dispense a less expensive, reasonably available,
interchangeable drug product . . . .”).
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pharmacists to make the substitution when possible, 53 while other
states merely allow the pharmacist to make the substitution. 54 States
also differ on what kind and what amount of patient notice is required
before substituting a generic drug. Ten states do not require any
patient notice before the pharmacist substitutes a generic drug. 55 In
Arizona, the pharmacist does not have to inform the patient of the
substitution if a third party reimburses the drug.56 In Iowa and Ohio,
the pharmacist does not have to inform the patient of the substitution
if public funding reimburses the drug. 57 Five states require patient
notice of substitution, but do not give the patient the right to refuse
the generic drug. 58 Twenty-nine states require the pharmacist to

53

The states that require substitution when possible are Florida, Hawaii,
Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New
York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, and West Virginia. See,
e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 465.025(2) (West 2013) (“A pharmacist who receives a
prescription for a brand name drug shall, unless requested otherwise by the
purchaser, substitute a less expensive, generically equivalent drug product . . . .”);
35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 960.3(a) (West 2014) (“Whenever a pharmacist receives a
prescription for a brand name drug, the pharmacist shall substitute a less expensive
generically equivalent drug unless requested otherwise by the purchaser or
indicated otherwise by the prescriber.”).
54
The states that allow, rather than require, the pharmacist to make
substitutions are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan,
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah,
Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 34-238(1) (2014) (“A licensed pharmacist in this state shall be permitted to select for the
brand name drug product . . . a less expensive pharmaceutically and therapeutically
equivalent drug product . . . .”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 2549(a) (West 2014)
(“When a pharmacist receives a prescription drug order from a practitioner for a
brand name or trade name drug, the pharmacist may dispense a therapeutically
equivalent drug . . . .”). The statutes in Idaho, Louisiana, and Oklahoma are
unclear. IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r. 27.01.01.185 (2013); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 37:1241 (2013); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 353.13(D) (West 2013).
55
The states that do not require patient notification are Alabama, Illinois,
Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Mexico, New York, North
Carolina, and Wyoming. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. § 15-118(a)
(West 2014); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 33-24-148 (West 2013).
56
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1963.01(B) (2013).
57
IOWA CODE ANN. § 155A.32(2)(b) (West 2013); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4729.38 (West 2013).
58
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 4052.5(e), 4073(e) (West 2014); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 12-42.5-122(3) (West 2014); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 2549(a)(2) (West
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notify the patient of the substitution, which the patient may refuse. 59
Maine, Tennessee, and Vermont require the pharmacist to notify the
patient of the substitution, which the patient may refuse, but if he
refuses the substitution he must pay the additional costs of the brand
name drug out-of-pocket.60
There are many advantages to allowing generic drug
substitution. Generic drugs are just as effective as brand name
drugs.61 Generic drugs are required to have the same dosage, safety,
strength, quality, purity, and stability as brand name drugs; generic
drugs must work the same, must be taken the same, and must be used
the same way as their brand name equivalents. 62 Generic drug
substitution lowers healthcare costs for both insurance companies and
patients. 63 If substitution for a generic drug happened in every
possible situation, costs could be reduced by an estimated $1.2 billion
annually for patients and $7.7 billion for health care systems. 64
Another advantage is that generic substitution makes patients more
likely to stick with their drug regime; when substitution is not
allowed, the chance that a patient will not purchase the drug at all
2014); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-42-22-8(a)(2) (West 2013); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.13408.03 (West 2013).
59
The states that require patient notification of substitution, which the patient
may refuse, are Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah,
Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 26-4-81(f)
(West 2013) (“A patient for whom a prescription drug order is intended may
instruct a pharmacist not to substitute a generic name drug in lieu of a brand name
drug.”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.41.130 (West 2013) (“Unless the brand
name drug is requested by the patient or the patient’s representative, the pharmacist
shall substitute an equivalent drug product . . . .”).
60
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 13781 (2013); TENN. CODE ANN. § 53-10205(d) (2013); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4605 (West 2013).
61
Generic Drugs: Questions and Answers, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/drugs/resourcesforyou/consumers/questionsanswers/ucm10010
0.htm (last updated Sept. 3, 2013).
62
Id.
63
William H. Shrank et al., The Consequences of Requesting “Dispense as
Written,” 124 AM. J. MED. 309, 311 (2011). Patients and their insurance
companies spent an average of $17.90 and $26.67, respectively, on generic drugs
and an average of $44.50 and $135.26, respectively, for brand name drugs with a
generic equivalent. Id.
64
Id. at 314.
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increases by 42% and the chance that a patient will not continue to
refill the prescription increases by 61% when compared to situations
where generic substitution is allowed. 65
III.

FEDERAL PREEMPTION DOCTRINE AND FAILURE-TO-WARN
CLAIMS

The Hatch–Waxman Act caused significant growth in the
pharmaceutical market by increasing the number of generic drugs
available to consumers.66 Prior to the Act, “only 35[%] of the topselling drugs with expired patents . . . had generic versions available.
Today, nearly all do.”67 Such success, however, has placed a burden
on the FDA to ensure that safety requirements are sufficient to
protect consumers. 68
A. Federal Preemption of State Laws
The Supremacy Clause in Article VI, clause two of the U.S.
Constitution gives rise to the doctrine of federal preemption. 69 Under
this doctrine, federal law may expressly or impliedly preempt state
law and cause the state law to have no effect.70 State law preemption
occurs in one of three ways: first, Congress may pass a statute that
explicitly defines how it preempts state law;71 second, Congress may
pass a statue that, although lacking expressly preemptive terms,
implies its occupation of an entire field of regulation and does not

65

Id. at 313.
Steele, supra note 47, at 459.
67
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, HOW
INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS AFFECTED PRICES AND
RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 17 (July 1998), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/6xx/doc655/pharm.pdf).
68
Id.
69
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.”).
70
Chamberlan v. Ford Motor Co., 314 F. Supp. 2d 953 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
71
Abbot v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 844 F.2d 1108, 1111 (4th Cir. 1988); see, e.g.,
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983) (finding that a New York human
rights law was preempted by a federal benefit plan based on the federal law’s plain
language, structure, and legislative history).
66
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allow states to regulate any aspect of the area;72 and third, Congress
may pass a statute that neither expressly nor impliedly preempts state
law, but state law is still preempted to the extent that the state law
conflicts with the federal law. 73 Such conflict occurs when it is
impossible to be in compliance with both the state and federal laws, 74
or when state law hinders the achievement of a federal purpose.75
There is, however, a presumption against state law
preemption in areas that the states have traditionally occupied.76 One
such area is the protection of health and safety. 77 The presumption is
that states have the power to regulate matters of health and safety
unless the government demonstrates a “clear and manifest purpose”
to preempt state law. 78 Therefore, Congress or the FDA must
provide a “clear indication” of an intention to preempt, or the antipreemption presumption will apply to state products liability
claims. 79
Since the federal requirements as outlined by the Hatch–
Waxman Act are different for name brand drug manufacturers and
generic drug manufacturers, a manufacturers’ liability case revolves
around whether the drug in question is brand name or generic. 80 This
intrinsic struggle between federal regulations and states’ own drug
safety laws creates problems, both for manufacturers trying to follow
the rules and unassuming consumers.
72

Abbot, 844 F.2d at 1111; see, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S.
218 (1947) (holding that an act passed by Congress in a field traditionally occupied
by the States preempted Illinois law).
73
Abbot, 844 F.2d at 1111.
74
Id.; see also Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142
(1963) (“The test of whether both federal and state regulations may operate, or the
state regulation must give way, is whether both regulations can be enforced without
impairing the federal superintendence of the field, not whether they are aimed at
similar or different objectives.”).
75
Abbot, 844 F.2d at 1111; see, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941)
(finding that the federal government has superior authority in the field of alien
registration, so state regulations cannot “conflict or interfere with, curtail or
complement, . . . or enforce additional or auxiliary regulations” in that area).
76
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996).
77
Id.
78
Hillsborough Cnty., Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715
(1985).
79
Id. at 716.
80
Suzanne Kaplan, Brand Name or Generic? The Choice Determines Your
Legal Options When the Drug is Defective, WESTLAW J. PROD. LIAB. (2013), 2013
WL 3984301, at *1.
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B. Failure-to-Warn Claims Under State Law
State law failure-to-warn claims usually look to the
Restatement (Second) of Torts for direction. 81 The Restatement
applies “where the defective condition of the product makes it
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer.” 82 Sellers must
provide directions or warnings on product containers to ensure that
the products are not unreasonably dangerous. 83 Some products—
namely drugs—cannot possibly be made safe, even when used in the
intended way, but their use may be justified even with the high
degree of risk involved. 84 If the drug is prepared properly and gives
adequate warning to its consumer, it is not considered unreasonably
dangerous.85 Sellers of drugs with proper preparation and warning
cannot be held to strict liability for the consequences of taking the
drug.86

81

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
Id. at cmt. i. Many food and drug products can never be entirely safe for
consumption by all people. An unreasonably dangerous product is one that is
“dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary
consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the
community as to its characteristics.” Id. For example, regular butter is not
unreasonably dangerous just because its ingestion may cause cholesterol build-up
in a person’s arteries and eventually lead to a heart attack. Butter would be
unreasonably dangerous, however, if it was contaminated with poisonous fish oil.
Id.
83
Id. at cmt. j. Sellers do not have a duty to warn against common allergies,
but if the product contains an ingredient that a large number of people are allergic
to and the ingredient is either not generally known to be dangerous or not
reasonably expected to be found in the product, the seller must warn against it if he
has, or should have, knowledge of the ingredient and its danger. Id. Sellers do not
have a duty to warn consumers about a product or ingredient if it is only dangerous
when consumed in excess or over a long period of time, or if the danger is
generally known. Id.
84
Id. at cmt. k.
85
Id.
86
Id.
82
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LEGAL REMEDIES FOR PRESCRIPTION DRUG CONSUMERS

Three recent Supreme Court cases addressed the issue of
federal preemption of state tort liability claims regarding label
requirements for brand name and generic manufacturers.87
A.

Wyeth v. Levine

In April 2000, Diana Levine was at Northeast Washington
County Community Health, Inc. (Health Center) to receive treatment
for a migraine headache.88 Levine suffered nausea as a result of the
migraine, so the Health Center administered an intramuscular
injection of Phenergan, the brand name drug for an antihistamine
manufactured by Wyeth called promethazine hydrochloride. 89 When
the first injection did not provide any relief, the Health Center
administered a second injection of Phenergan intravenously. 90 The
drug inadvertently entered Levine’s artery and came into contact with
her blood.91 Levine developed gangrene and her right forearm had to
be amputated. 92 Because of the amputation, Levine suffered
significant medical expenses and was no longer able to perform as a
professional musician. 93
The Court in Wyeth addressed the issue of whether federal
drug regulations applicable to brand name drug manufacturers
preempt state law failure-to-warn claims against drug manufacturers
for failure to properly warn consumers about the risks of taking the
drug.94 The Court held in a 6–3 decision that federal drug regulations
do not preempt state law failure-to-warn claims against brand name
drug manufacturers.95
Justice Stevens explained that federal law did not preempt
Levine’s state tort claim because of the two bases of the preemption

87

Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013); PLIVA, Inc. v.
Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011); Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009).
88
Levine v. Wyeth, 944 A.2d 179, 182 (Vt. 2006), aff’d, 555 U.S. 555 (2009).
89
Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 559.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id. at 563.
95
Id. at 581.
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doctrine.96 First and foremost is the purpose of Congress.97 Second,
in areas where states have traditionally occupied, we must assume
that the police powers of the state are not preempted by federal law
unless it is Congress’s “clear and manifest purpose” to preempt those
powers.98 In reviewing the history of federal regulation of drug laws
and labeling,99 the Court found that Congress acted to preserve state
law.100 A provision of the 1962 Keflauver–Harris Amendments to
the FDCA suggested that only a conflict between state law and the
FDCA would cause the state law to be preempted. 101 Under that
provision, state tort claims “continued unabated despite . . . FDA
regulation.” 102 Additionally, in 1976, Congress passed an express
preemption provision for medical devices, 103 but chose not to do so
for prescription drugs, indicating that Congress did not intend to
preempt state law in that area.104
The Court rejected Wyeth’s argument that it was impossible
to comply with both the state and federal laws’ labeling
requirements.105 “[T]he FDA’s belief that a drug is misbranded is not
conclusive,” the Court stated, “And the very idea that the FDA would
bring an enforcement action against a manufacturer for strengthening
a warning pursuant to the [changes being effected] regulation is
difficult to accept . . . .”106 The Court explained that the FDA was
not the primary authority responsible for drug labeling; “it has
remained a central premise of federal drug regulation that the
manufacturer bears responsibility for the content of its label at all
times.”107 The manufacturer is the one held accountable for ensuring
that a drug’s label is, and remains, adequate.108
The Court also rejected Wyeth’s argument that state law
obstructs Congress’s intent to balance competing interests. 109 The
96

Id. at 565.
Id.
98
Id.
99
See supra Part II.
100
Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 567.
101
Id.
102
Id. (quoting Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 340 (2008)).
103
See 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2012).
104
Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 567.
105
Id. at 568.
106
Id. at 570.
107
Id. at 570–71.
108
Id. at 571.
109
Id. at 573.
97
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lack of federal remedy for consumers injured by unsafe drugs in the
original statute or its amendments suggests that Congress deemed
state rights of action to be sufficient relief. 110 Congress may have
also determined that remedies under state law give consumers more
protection by encouraging manufacturers to produce safe drugs with
appropriate warnings. 111 Congress’s silence on express preemption,
along with its understanding of the state law claims, indicates that it
did not intend for the FDA to be the sole governing authority of drug
safety. 112 “If Congress thought state-law suits posed an obstacle to
its objective, it surely would have enacted an express pre-emption
provision at some point during the FDCA’s 70-year history.”113
After the Levine decision, courts routinely held that federal
drug labeling regulations did not preempt state law requirements for
adequate drug labeling of brand name drugs. 114 However, courts
were unsure of how to deal with the issue of preemption concerning
generic drugs.115 In 2011, the Supreme Court resolved the issue in a
5–4 decision in Mensing. 116
B. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing
Gladys Mensing and Julie Demahy were each prescribed the
drug Reglan in 2001 and 2002, respectively. 117 Both women
received the generic version of Reglan, metoclopramide, from their
pharmacists.118 After taking the drug for several years, each woman
developed tardive dyskinesia, a severe neurological disorder. 119
The majority in Mensing addressed the issue of whether
federal drug regulations applicable to generic drug manufacturers
preempt state law claims. 120 The Court held that the federal drug
110

Id.
Id.
112
Id. at 575.
113
Id. at 574.
114
Steele, supra note 47, at 478.
115
See Demahy v. Activis, Inc., 593 F.3d 428, 431 n.7 (5th Cir. 2010)
(showing a split among circuit courts on the question of federal preemption of state
law for generic drugs).
116
PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011).
117
Id. at 2573.
118
Id.
119
Id. at 2572–73.
120
Id. at 2572.
111
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regulations do preempt the same state law claims against generic
drug manufacturers. 121 The Court found that, in this case, it was
impossible for the metoclopramide manufacturers to meet the
requirements of both the state and federal labeling laws. 122 Justice
Thomas explained that state laws required the manufacturers to
include a safer label to metoclopramide, but federal law ordered
generic manufacturers to include the same label on their drugs as
Therefore, the generic
their brand name counterparts. 123
manufacturers could not have satisfied both the requirements of the
state and federal drug labeling laws without additional action, such as
asking the FDA to change the label of the brand name drug. 124
The Court considered whether conflict preemption should
take into account possible actions the FDA and brand name drug
manufacturers could take to allow the generic drug counterparts to
satisfy both state and federal laws without changing the law. 125
Federal law does not tell generic drug manufacturers what exactly to
put on the labels; it merely requires that the generic drug label match
the associated brand name drug’s label. 126 Consequently, generic
manufacturers could come into compliance with federal law if they
could compel the FDA and the brand name drug manufacturer to
change the label on the brand name drug to fulfill the state law
labeling requirements that the generic manufacturers are subject to.127
If the Court were to require generic drug manufacturers to
convince the FDA to change brand name drug labels, then it would
no longer be impossible for the generic manufacturers to comply with
both state and federal labeling laws. 128 But the Court rejected that
proposition: “If these conjectures suffice to prevent federal and state
law from conflicting for Supremacy Clause purposes, it is unclear
when, outside of express pre-emption, the Supremacy Clause would
have any force.” 129 The text of the Supremacy Clause “plainly

121

Id. at 2581.
Id. at 2577–78.
123
Id. at 2578.
124
Id.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
Id. at 2579.
129
Id.
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contemplates conflict pre-emption” and “suggests that federal law
should be understood to impliedly repeal conflicting state law.” 130
A party establishes preemption when the “ordinary meaning”
of the federal law disallows the party from acting independently to
accomplish state law requirements. 131 In this case, the generic
manufacturers could not meet state law requirements without the
“special permission and assistance” of the federal government. 132
Thus, the claims of the generic manufacturers were preempted.133
The Court acknowledged the fact that it makes little sense,
from a consumer’s perspective, to rule that federal regulations
preempt in this case but not in Wyeth; however, the Court reasoned
that it could not disregard the Supremacy Clause simply to please the
consumer. 134 Unlike the generic manufacturers in Mensing, the
brand name manufacturers in Wyeth could have changed their labels
to meet state law guidelines without the assistance of the FDA. 135
Had the injured consumers taken the brand name drug instead of the
generic, state law would control; but because their pharmacists
substituted the generic drug—an action that is allowed and
sometimes required by state law—federal law governs these
claims. 136 Unfortunately for Mensing, Demahy, and other similarly
situated generic drug consumers, federal drug regulations place
injured generic drug consumers in the losing position.137
The dissenting opinion, authored by Justice Sotomayor,
viewed the issue of preemption differently. 138 She argued that
federal preemption could only occur when the manufacturers could
not possible follow both state and federal laws and that it was not
impossible for the generic manufacturers in this case to comply with
both sets of laws.139 “[T]he mere possibility of impossibility had not
been enough to establish pre-emption,” the dissent said, and generic
manufacturers had the burden of proving that the FDA would have
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Id. at 2579–80.
Id. at 2580.
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Id. at 2580–81.
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Id.
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denied the request to change the warning. 140 The dissent did agree
with the majority that, under current laws, generic manufacturers are
not allowed to unilaterally change their labels, 141 but then the dissent
argued that the inability to unilaterally change the warning label was
not an excuse to do nothing while they believed the label was
inadequate. 142 Generic manufacturers, the dissent argued, have a
federal duty to monitor the safety of the drug and should propose
label modifications to the FDA if the manufacturer believes it is
necessary. 143 The dissent lamented the effect that the majority’s
ruling would have on the prescription drug industry, maintaining that
the holding would decrease demand for generic drugs and create
ethical quandaries for prescribing physicians. 144
C. Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett
In December 2004, Karen Bartlett went to the doctor for
treatment of pain in her right shoulder. 145 Her doctor prescribed the
drug Clinoril, a non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drug. 146 Bartlett’s
pharmacist filled the prescription with sulindac, the generic version
of Clinoril, which was manufactured by Mutual. 147 In a matter of
weeks, Bartlett had to go to the emergency room for skin blisters, a
fever, eye irritation, and other symptoms. 148 She was diagnosed with
Stevens–Johnson Syndrome (SJS) progressing to toxic epidermal
necrolysis (TEN). 149 SJS/TEN causes necrosis of the skin and
mucous membranes and is potentially fatal. 150 Bartlett spent three
months in the hospital and left with permanent injuries, including
blindness.151 At the time that Bartlett received her prescription for
sulindac, the label listed SJN/TEN under potential adverse reactions,
140

Id.
Id. at 2585.
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
Id. at 2593.
145
Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 731 F. Supp. 2d 135, 142 (D.N.H. 2010), aff’d,
678 F.3d 30 (1st Cir. 2012), rev’d , 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013).
146
Bartlett, 731 F. Supp. 2d at 142.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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but did not mention SJS/TEN by name under the warnings section. 152
After Bartlett’s severe reaction to the drug, the FDA conducted an
analysis of the risks and benefits of nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory
drugs (NSAIDs), such as sulindac, and recommended changing the
labels of all NSAIDs, including sulindac, to explicitly warn against
TEN.153
The Court in Bartlett addressed the issue of whether federal
drug regulations preempt state design-defect claims based on the
adequacy of the drug’s warnings. 154 Justice Alito explained that state
law design-defect claims put the manufacturers in a situation where
they are in conflict with federal regulations because the only ways for
the manufacturers to improve a drug’s safety are either to change the
drug’s composition or change the labeling, both of which are not
allowable actions under federal drug regulation laws.155 The Court
held that generic drug manufacturers cannot be sued under state law
for injuries caused by their products because the state law is
preempted by federal law. 156 This case shows that the Court
followed the same line of reasoning used for failure-to-warn claims
in Mensing to extend federal preemption to design-defect claims.
Although the holding in Bartlett is very similar to the Court’s
holding in Mensing, Bartlett addressed two issues that Mensing left
undecided. 157 First, the Court established that impossibility
preemption applies to design-defect claims in addition to failure-towarn claims. 158 Just as generic drug manufacturers are prohibited
from changing the labels on their drugs without FDA approval, so too
are the manufacturers prohibited from unilaterally altering the design
of their drugs.159 Therefore, it was almost inevitable that the Court
would extend the Mensing decision to apply to design-defect
claims. 160
Second, the majority rejected the “stop-selling”
rationale—the theory that the generic manufacturer could escape the
impossibility of complying with both federal and state laws by
152

Id.
Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2472 (2013).
154
Id. at 2470.
155
Id. at 2479.
156
Id. at 2470.
157
Louis M. Bograd, Doubling Down on Generic Drug Preemption, TRIAL,
Nov. 2013, at 52.
158
Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2470.
159
Id. at 2477–78.
160
Bograd, supra note 157, at 54.
153
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choosing not to produce the drug at all—as a valid option for
manufacturers to avoid impossibility preemption. 161 Again, this
decision was not surprising given that acceptance of the stop-selling
rationale would also effectively overturn the decisions in Mensing
and other failure-to-warn cases. 162
The Supreme Court’s recent decisions addressing the issue of
federal preemption of state tort liability claims against brand name
and generic manufacturers have clearly established the scope of
federal preemption in certain types of cases, but have also raised
questions about whether the laws that limit the legal remedies
available to consumers are appropriate. In Wyeth, the Court found
that brand name drug manufacturers are not preempted from failureto-warn claims because they can change the warning labels of their
products without FDA approval. 163 But despite the Wyeth Court’s
ruling, the Court decided in Mensing that federal law does preempt
generic drug manufacturers from state law failure-to-warn claims
because generic manufacturers cannot strengthen their drugs’
warning labels unilaterally. 164 Finally, the Court further restricted
consumer remedies against drug manufacturers in Bartlett by holding
that state law design-defect claims against generic manufacturers are
also preempted by federal law because generic manufacturers cannot
change the composition of their drugs unilaterally. 165
V.

INNOVATOR LIABILITY THEORY

In light of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Wyeth, Mensing,
and Bartlett, state courts are grappling with how to provide injured
consumers with remedies in state tort law if a generic drug caused the
injury. Courts in Alabama, California, and Vermont have adopted
the innovator liability theory (also called competitor liability theory),
which holds brand name drug manufacturers liable when a consumer
is injured after taking the generic version of the drug.166 The theory
161

Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2477.
Id. at 2478.
163
Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 591 (2009).
164
PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2578 (2011).
165
Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2470.
166
See Wyeth, Inc. v. Weeks, No. 1:10-cv-602, 2013 WL 135753, at *19
(M.D. Ala. Jan.11, 2013) (“Under Alabama law, a brand-name drug company may
be held liable for fraud or misrepresentation (by misstatement or omission), based
on statements it made in connection with the manufacture of a brand-name
162
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is based on the belief that a consumer taking a generic drug should be
able to reasonably rely on the warnings on the brand name drug
equivalent, since the generic and brand name drugs must be
bioequivalent and have identical labels. 167 Since the consumer may
rely on the brand name drug warnings, the consumer maintains the
right to a file a failure-to-warn claim against the brand name
manufacturer, regardless of whether the consumer actually used and
was injured by the brand name drug.168
When an injured consumer files a failure-to-warn claim, it is a
negligence action.169 In order to prove negligence, the plaintiff must
prove that the brand name manufacturer had a duty to warn, that the
duty to warn was breached, and that the breach of duty was caused by
the brand name manufacturer’s failure to warn. 170 The standard of
care is that of the average reasonable person. 171 Since failure-towarn is not a claim of a manufacturing defect, liability is not limited
to the company who actually manufactured the drug.172 Therefore,
creative attorneys have tried to find ways to subject brand name
manufacturers to liability even when the injured plaintiff only took
the generic form of the drug.
The Fourth Circuit was the first appellate court to address the
innovator liability theory in the pharmaceutical industry. 173 The
court held in Foster v. American Home Products, Corp. that the
injured plaintiff could not recover from the brand name manufacturer
when she was injured by the generic drug.174 The court found that
the brand name manufacturer did not have a duty of care to the
plaintiff because the plaintiff was not injured by the manufacturer’s
drug.175 In order to prevail against the brand name manufacturer, the

prescription drug, by a plaintiff claiming physical injury caused by a generic drug
manufactured by a different company.”); Kellogg v. Wyeth, 762 F. Supp. 2d 694
(D. Vt. 2010); Conte v. Wyeth, Inc., 168 Cal. App. 4th 89 (2008).
167
Weeks, 2013 WL 135753, at *4.
168
Id. at *19.
169
Wesley E. Weeks, Picking Up the Tab for Your Competitors: Innovator
Liability After PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1257, 1274
(2012).
170
Id.
171
Id.
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Id.
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Foster v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 29 F.3d 165 (4th Cir. 1994).
174
Id. at 172.
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Id. at 171.
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plaintiff would have had to show that the defendant actually
manufactured the product that caused the injury. 176
Innovator liability claims were previously unsuccessful 177
because courts relied on the ability of generic manufacturers to add
or supplement warnings on their drugs.178 But in 2008, a California
appellate court became the first to allow an injured consumer to bring
a claim against a brand name manufacturer for injuries caused by the
generic version of the drug. 179 In Conte v. Wyeth, Inc., plaintiff
Elizabeth Conte took the generic drug metoclopramide for the brand
name drug Reglan.180 After taking metoclopramide for several years,
Conte developed a debilitating neurological disorder. 181 She filed
suit against both the generic and brand name manufacturers, claiming
that the drug’s label did not adequately warn about the serious side
effects of long-term use. 182 The court held that the brand name
manufacturer had a duty of care to consumers of the generic drug
because it was “eminently foreseeable” that a patient would receive
the generic drug based on the representation from the brand name
manufacturer about the brand name drug.183
In Kellogg v. Wyeth, a federal court similarly found that it
was “reasonably foreseeable that a physician will rely upon a brand
name manufacturer’s representations—or the absence of
representations—about the risk of side effects of its drug, . . .
regardless of whether the pharmacist fills the prescription with a
generic form of the drug.”184
Although innovator liability has been claimed in many cases,
very few courts have actually followed the lead of Conte and Kellogg
in shifting liability. 185 The Levine and Mensing decisions, however,
176

Id. at 172.
See, e.g., Fullington v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 4:10CV00236 JLH, 2010 WL
3632747 (E.D. Ark. Sept. 17, 2010); Fields v. Wyeth, Inc., 613 F. Supp. 2d 1056
(E.D. Ark. 2009).
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Kellogg v. Wyeth, 762 F. Supp. 2d 694, 709 (D. Vt. 2010).
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See, e.g., Smith v. Wyeth, 657 F.3d 420 (6th Cir. 2011); Moore v. Mylan,
Inc., 840 F. Supp. 2d 1337 (N.D. Ga. 2012); Lashley v. Pfizer, Inc., 877 F. Supp.
2d 466 (S.D. Miss. 2012); Eckhardt v. Qualitest Pharm., Inc., 889 F. Supp. 2d 901
(S.D. Tex. 2012); Metz v. Wyeth, 830 F. Supp. 2d 1291 (M.D. Fla. 2011).
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have brought the option of innovator liability back to light, since the
results of these two decisions created two different sets of liability
rules for brand name manufacturers and generic manufacturers. 186
Because generic drug users do not have the same options for
recovery that brand name drug users do, it is likely that attorneys and
courts will be more open to the innovator liability argument.
A. Duty to Warn
The general nature of the duty to warn allows it to apply to
consumers who relied on the brand name manufacturer’s warnings,
even if the actual drug ingested by the consumer was a generic
version. 187 Brand name manufacturers have a duty to avoid
foreseeable harm by properly warning consumers of the drug. 188
Since it is foreseeable that generic manufacturing companies will
eventually produce a generic version of the brand name company’s
drug, that duty extends to the third parties that take the generic
version. 189 Although courts previously disregarded foreseeability as
stretching the concept too far,190 the Mensing and Bartlett decisions
made it easily foreseeable that generic drug consumers will rely on
brand name drug warnings because that is the only warning
allowed. 191 Furthermore, since substituting generic drugs for brand
name is common practice by pharmacists,192 it makes it even more
foreseeable that generic drug consumers will rely on the brand name
drug warnings. 193
One might argue that a generic manufacturer assumes the risk
of inadequate labeling by the brand name manufacturer, but in
negligence cases the defendant is only liable if the adopted label was
negligently adopted.194 Since the brand name drug labels must be
186
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FDA-approved and the generic drug manufacturers are legally
required to adopt the brand name label, it is not negligent for the
generic manufacturers to do so.195
B. Cause of the Harm
In a failure-to-warn case, the harm is caused by an inadequate
warning; it is not the drug itself that causes the harm. 196 In order to
prevail on a failure-to-warn claim, the consumer must prove factual
cause, which means “but for” the inadequate warning, the consumer
of the drug would not have suffered harm. 197 Even though, under
Mensing and Bartlett, a manufacturer cannot be held responsible for
a warning that it did not create and that it was legally required to put
on its product,198 it is the inadequate warning that causes the harm,
not the manufacturing of the drug itself. 199 Any inadequacy in the
brand name drug’s original warning will flow down to the generic
drug’s warning, causing foreseeable harm to the generic consumer. 200
It is direct causation because the generic manufacturer cannot alter
the warning in any way. 201 The only action that a generic
manufacturer can take is to choose not to market an inadequately
labeled drug or inform the FDA of the inadequate warning. 202 In
either case, the action is not a superseding cause and therefore does
not change the fact that the brand name manufacturer caused the
harm with the inadequate label. 203
The learned intermediary doctrine also creates a cause of
harm by brand name manufacturers. 204 The learned intermediary
doctrine states that a brand name manufacturer’s duty to warn is met
when a physician relies on the manufacturer’s warning when

195
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prescribing the drug. 205 If the doctor relies on an inadequate
warning, the harm is done at that time; it does not matter that a
pharmacist may later fill the prescription with the generic drug. 206
Under current FDA regulations, a generic drug manufacturer
cannot alter the warning from the brand name drug. 207 Since the
generic manufacturer cannot and does not create the warning for the
drug that causes harm to a consumer, the generic manufacturer
cannot be held liable. A manufacturer cannot be held responsible for
a warning that it did not create and that it was legally required to put
on its product. 208 Another way to look at the issue is that if one
particular generic manufacturer exits the market, it will not decrease
the harm done to consumers of the generic drug; the pharmacist will
just prescribe a generic drug from a different manufacturer (or the
brand name drug) and it will have the same inadequate warning. 209
The only way for the harm to be avoided is for the brand name
manufacturer to change the warning.
C. Implications of Innovator Liability
Innovator liability creates problems for brand name
manufacturers. Since the brand name manufacturer is the one who
invests time and money into the research and development of the
drug, the increased liability reduces the profitability of producing
new drugs and allows generic manufacturers to enjoy the benefits of
the brand name manufacturer’s work without the additional
liability. 210 Even if the brand name drug is removed from the market,
the manufacturer is still liable for harm caused by competing generic
drugs. 211 Although it may seem unfair, it is still the brand name
manufacturer’s negligence in labeling that is the cause of the injury
and whether or not the manufacturer continues to sell the product has
no impact on its duty to consumers who rely on the manufacturer’s
labeling. 212
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Innovator liability also creates problems concerning generic
drug manufacturing as well. 213 Since the generic manufacturers are
not at risk for inadequate warnings on their drugs, they are able to
sell their drugs to consumers at a low price, but that price is not a true
reflection of the cost of selling a potentially harmful drug.214 If the
drug is indeed inadequately labeled, the harm to society might be
increased because more people are able to afford and consume the
drug.215 The brand name manufacturer would be the one liable for
the harm caused to all the injured consumers, and that would
disincentivize the brand name manufacturer from researching and
developing new drugs at the risk of inadequately labeling the drug.216
Overall, innovator liability likely results in less new drug
development.217
Since current FDA regulations prohibit a generic drug
manufacturer from altering the warning label from the brand name
drug, the generic manufacturer cannot be held liable for a poorly
labeled drug.218 Although protecting generic manufacturers against
liability for something they cannot control is a correct application of
current administrative regulations, it has significant negative
implications for brand name manufacturers, prescription drug
consumers, and even generic manufacturers.
VI.

IMPACT ON DRUG SUBSTITUTIONS

Although the recent Court decisions were a win for generic
drug manufacturers, there will likely be some repercussions in the
form of decreased numbers of generic drug substitutions. 219
Decreased numbers of substitutions would happen because
physicians would stop allowing substitutions, pharmacists would stop
making automatic substitutions, patients would start denying
substitutions or requesting brand name drugs, or states would change
their substitution laws to deter or eliminate generic substitutions. 220
213
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Physicians have several motivations for disallowing
substitutions.221 One reason is to preserve the patient’s right to seek
compensation if the generic drug is inadequately labeled. 222 Another
reason is to avoid malpractice claims against them for negligently
prescribing an inadequately labeled drug.223 Patients have the ability
to sue multiple sources for their injuries, so a physician could be sued
for negligently prescribing the medication that caused the injury. 224
If physicians feel as though inadequately labeled generic drugs may
harm their patients, it is likely that physicians will start to prevent
substitution more frequently. 225
Perhaps the largest potential cause of decreased drug
substitutions would be changes in state laws. Although most changes
to drug substitution laws have been in favor of promoting drug
substitution, 226 the recent Supreme Court decisions in Wyeth,
Mensing, and Bartlett will increase the pressure on states to change
their laws to discourage generic substitution. The ten states that
allow pharmacists to substitute generic drugs without informing the
patient227 are more likely to seek to change their laws so that patients
are not deprived of their rights to sue the manufacturer without
notice; studies show that patient consent is correlated to a decrease in
generic substitution.228
221
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States are also more likely to change their laws to require
physicians to expressly state whether generic substitution is permitted
to not, which would force physicians to consider the question each
time they prescribed a drug.229 States have to find a way to balance
the financial and compliance benefits of generic substitution with the
deprivation of the right to seek compensation that is now a concern in
light of the recent Court decisions.
WAYS TO BALANCE OPTIONS FOR PATIENTS HARMED BY
BRAND NAME OR GENERIC DRUGS

VII.

There are several ways that the differences in treatment
between harms caused by brand name drugs and harms caused by
generic drugs can be balanced for the consumer. The Court may
reverse or limit the holdings from Wyeth, Mensing, or Bartlett, but
such action is very unlikely unless the FDA changes its position,
because the Court relied on the FDA’s regulations and interpretations
in coming to its decisions in those cases. 230 Other ways to balance
treatment are waiver of the preemption defense by generic
manufacturers (either by the manufacturer’s own choice or by force
by the state), state action that would permit injured consumers to
bring an action against the brand name manufacturer (under the
innovator liability theory), or congressional action to overrule any of
the Court’s decisions. 231
A. No Changes
Under the current post-Mensing law, attorneys for clients
injured by generic drugs do not have the option to seek damages
under state failure-to-warn claims.232 University of California, Irvine
School of Law Dean Erwin Chemerinsky believes that, until a better
solution is put into place, attorneys have the responsibility to find
alternative ways to litigate on behalf of such clients. 233 “The
229
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immediate challenge for lawyers representing patients harmed by
generic drugs,” Chemerinsky says, “is to develop alternative
litigation theories. This may require suing parties other than the
makers of generic drugs or devising claims based on grounds other
than failure to warn.”234 Possible alternatives include bringing claims
against the prescriber of the injuring drug or taking action against the
manufacturer for negligence or fraud.235
Advocates of the current law argue that Congress’s purpose,
as conveyed through the Hatch–Waxman Amendments, is to allow
federal preemption for generic drug manufacturers with respect to
state failure-to-warn claims. 236 They believe that if Congress had
intended an alternative to be available, it would have expressly
addressed the issue in the Amendments;237 in fact, they contend that
Congress’s real purpose for sheltering generic manufacturers from
failure-to-warn liability is to maintain low costs for prescription drug
consumers. 238 More consumers will have access to prescription
medications if generic manufacturers can keep their drug costs low in
part by avoiding costly litigation.239
Opponents of the current law maintain that the use of generic
drugs will decline because physicians will be more hesitant to
prescribe generic drugs or allow for generic substitution, and
consumers will be deterred from using generic drugs because of the
legal implications.240 They also argue that the current law limits the
rights of consumers injured by generic drugs with inadequate labels,
allows for a regulatory system that will negatively affect drug safety,
and is at odds with Congress’s purpose to make brand name and
generic drugs identical. 241 Congress allowed for an abbreviated
approval process for generic drugs because they are bioequivalent to
their brand name counterparts. 242 This revised process allowed
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Congress to “provide a safe, effective, low cost alternative to the
American public.”243 Challengers of the Mensing decision argue that
allowing different levels of state tort liability to apply to generic and
brand name drug manufacturers is, in essence, stating that generic
and brand name drugs are not equivalents and that only consumers of
brand name drugs have to right to bring failure-to-warn claims in
state court.244
B. Reverse or Limit the Holdings
The Supreme Court has the authority to reverse or limit its
holding in a previous case.245 Although it is unlikely that the Court
would choose to reverse or limit any of its holdings of its own
accord, it seems more likely if the FDA makes certain changes to its
guidelines. In Mensing, the Court states “[a]ll relevant events in
these cases predate the Food and Drug Administration Amendments
Act of 2007. We therefore refer exclusively to the pre–2007 statutes
and regulations and express no view on the impact of the 2007
Act.”246 The meaning of this statement is not clear, but there are a
few possibilities. 247 The first is that the Court believes the
amendments granted the FDA the ability to require post-market
studies, and such action would cause the Court to come to a different
decision in Mensing. 248 If the FDA requires generic drug
manufacturers to perform post–market studies, then those
manufacturers might have enough information about the drug that
they could be allowed to amend their own labels. 249 In that case,
state law would not be preempted because the label changes would
be allowed and Mensing would not be good law.
The Court’s statement may also be in reference to the ability
granted by the amendments to the FDA to order label changes. 250
Prior to the 2007 amendments, the FDA could suggest a label change
approved/approvalapplications/abbreviatednewdrugapplicationandagenerics/
default.htm (last updated July 17, 2013).
243
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244
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245
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246
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to a brand name drug manufacturer but the manufacturer was free to
disregard the suggestion; the FDA could chose not to continue to
approve a drug with a label that did not include the FDA’s suggested
changes, but the manufacturer had no obligation to make the
suggested changes. 251 Now, the FDA does not have to try to
convince the brand name manufacturer that a change needs to be
made; the FDA can just mandate the change. 252 In Mensing, the
claim was brought under pre-2007 rules, so the FDA could not just
force the brand name manufacturer to change its label. The generic
manufacturer would have had to ask the FDA to suggest a label
change, and then the FDA would have had to negotiate with the
brand name manufacturer to decide on and implement a new label.253
Regardless of the amendments, however, the generic manufacturer
would still be unable to independently change the labels on its drugs,
and that is what the Court relied on to determine the impossibility of
the manufacturers’ compliance with state and federal law. 254
Therefore, it is unlikely that such an interpretation of the Court’s
statement would have reversed its decision.
C. FDA Change of Position
The most likely method of changing the results of Mensing
and Bartlett is for the FDA to allow generic manufacturers to
unilaterally change their drug labels. 255 The FDA was the originator
of the distinction between brand name and generic manufacturers; the
Court just followed suit.256 The FDA’s rationale for the distinction
was that it wanted brand name and generic drugs to be equivalent so
that a consumer could rely on a generic drug to be equivalent to the
brand name. 257 Consistent labeling, the FDA reasoned, would

251

Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 571 (2009).
Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 11085, § 901(a), 121 Stat. 823, 924 (2007) (amending 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(4)).
253
PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2578 (2011).
254
Id. at 2579.
255
Kazhdan, supra note 219, at 918.
256
Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2575–69.
257
Kazhdan, supra note 219, at 918.
252

146

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

34-1

minimize confusion and enforce confidence in product
equivalency. 258
The generic manufacturer, however, argued that the ability to
unilaterally change or add to warnings created benefits that
outweighed those of consistent labeling.259 If the change proposed
by the generic manufacturer is agreed to by the FDA, then the brand
name manufacturer would have to change its label as well and there
would still be consistency; if the FDA did not agree with the change,
the generic manufacturer would return to the brand name label. 260
Also, even under the current rules, when a brand name manufacturer
changes its label to reflect new warnings, it takes time for the FDA to
review the change and for the generic manufacturers the change their
labels, so labels are already inconsistent between the brand name and
generic drug during that period of change.261 If the FDA changed its
regulations to allow generic manufacturers to unilaterally change
their labels, then it seems likely that the Court would change its
position. 262
D. Generic Manufacturer Waiver of Its Preemption Defense
Another option for altering the outcome caused by the Court’s
decisions is for generic drug manufacturers to waive their preemption
defense. 263 Even though it seems counterintuitive for the very
companies who fought for federal preemption from failure-to-warn
claims 264 to waive that defense, it might become a good business
258
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practice for generic manufacturers if sales of generic drugs decrease
due to the decrease in generic drug substitutions. 265 Generic
manufacturers would face a problem, however, if they attempted to
waive their preemption defense. 266 Since generic manufacturers are
generally not distinguishable as individual companies by consumers,
the manufacturers do not advertise their products because doing so
would benefit all generic drugs with the same chemical name. 267 The
same issue occurs if a generic manufacturer decides that it would be
beneficial to waive its preemption defense; if one generic
manufacturer waives its preemption defense, then all the
manufacturers will gain consumer goodwill, even if they do not all
allow their consumers to sue.268 Therefore, even though the effect of
preemption might be harmful to the generic manufacturers’ bottom
line, waiving the preemption defense may not work to avoid the
problem. 269
E. State Action
States do not have the statutory authority to overrule the
Supreme Court’s decisions, but there are other options that states can
pursue.270 Two options are: (1) to require generic manufacturers to
waive their preemption defense before allowing that manufacturer’s
drug to be substituted, or (2) to allow injured patients to bring suits
against the equivalent brand name drug manufacturers.271
A required waiver would limit generic drug substitution to
only drugs from manufacturers that waived their preemption
defense. 272 The state would maintain a list of generic drug
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manufacturers that had waived their preemption defense and only
drugs from those manufacturers would be allowed to be substituted
for brand name drugs. 273 Therefore, generic drug manufacturers
would have the choice of whether or not they wanted to waive their
tort liability. If the manufacturer chose not to waive its preemption
defense, then substitution of its generic drug for the equivalent brand
name drug would not be allowed in that state.274
One potential problem with required waivers would arise if
contractual waivers are not judicially enforceable. 275 The First
Circuit has held that “[a] statutory right or remedy may be waived
when the waiver would not frustrate the public policies of the statute.
. . . [But a] statutory right may not be disclaimed if the waiver could
‘do violence to the public policy underlying the legislative
enactment.’”276 If allowing state tort claims for inadequate labeling
clashes with the policies underlying the Hatch–Waxman Act, then the
Court would likely find that state laws requiring generic
manufacturers to waive their preemption defense are invalid as
“obstacle[s] to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress.” 277
The second option for states, to allow suits against equivalent
brand name drug manufacturers, would allow injured patients to have
some form of recourse against drug manufacturers. The logic behind
allowing these types of suits is that the reason the generic drug label
was not more accurate was because the brand name had not changed
its label to be more accurate.278 Most courts at this time do not allow
this argument and require that an injured plaintiff must have taken
the defendant manufacturer’s drug, not a bioequivalent drug.279

273

Id.
Id.
275
Id. at 923.
276
Canal Elec. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 548 N.E.2d 182, 187 (Mass.
1990) (quoting Spence v. Reeder, 416 N.E.2d 914, 924 (Mass. 1981)).
277
Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000).
278
PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2576–77 (2011).
279
See Kenneth Sills, Liability of Name Brand Drug Manufacturer for Injury
or Death Resulting from Use of Prescription Drug’s Generic Equivalent, 56 A.L.R.
6TH 161 (2010) (containing a collection of cases in which the court considered the
liability of brand name manufacturers for injuries or deaths to a patient who took
the generic bioequivalent of the brand name drug).
274

Spring 2014

Hidden Risks of Taking Generic Drugs over Brand Name

149

F. Congressional Action
Congress could balance the difference in treatment of claims
for injured patients by making the preemption laws uniform for both
brand name and generic drugs.280 The Court in Wyeth,281 Mensing,282
and Bartlett283 makes it clear that Congress did not explicitly state
whether it wanted preemption or not, and had Congress made the
point explicitly, the Court would have accepted and followed that
decision. If Congress would either explicitly make preemption laws
consistent for both generic and brand name drug manufacturers or
allow generic drug manufacturers to unilaterally change their labels,
then the decisions in Mensing and Bartlett would effectively be
reversed. 284
VIII.

CONCLUSION

It is clear from the amount of money spent on prescription
drugs in the United States and the increase in spending on generic
drugs that the effects of choosing a generic drug over a brand name
drug are increasingly important for consumers who might be injured
by the drug. The lower cost of generic drugs make substitution an
appealing choice, but patients may not know about the hidden risks
of choosing generic over brand name. The Supreme Court has
280
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endured much criticism for its decisions in Wyeth, Mensing, and
Bartlett and it acknowledges, the “situation is tragic and evokes deep
sympathy,” however, “a straightforward application of pre-emption
law” requires that federal law preempts state failure-to-warn and
design-defect claims. 285 Therefore, the FDA and Congress must
work together to resolve the preemption issues arising out of state
tort claims by patients injured by generic drugs in order for the
Supreme Court to change its stance in the matter.
As the decisions in Mensing and Bartlett demonstrated, the
current preemption laws do not give the Court the ability to allow
state tort claims against generic manufacturers. The FDA and
Congress have the ability to change the laws so that this imbalance
can be righted. Although there are other ways that the states or
manufacturers could work to provide a solution to the problem, it
should ultimately fall to the FDA and Congress to revise the
preemption laws to allow injured patients to bring claims against
generic manufacturers. By doing so, the FDA and Congress could
bring individual liability to federal drug regulation and the state tort
systems where current laws have created unwanted and unnecessary
results.
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